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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERTS INVESTMENT COM-
P ANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GI B B 0 N S AND REED CON-
CRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
GIBBONS AND REED CON-
CRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
FRANK W. ROBERTS and W. 
CALVIN ROBERTS dba ROB-
ERTS INVESTlWENT C 0 M-
P ANY, et al., 
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NATURE OF CASE 
This is a consolidation of two separate actions, one :e 
brought by respondent for slander of title, the other 
by appellant for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and a 
money judgment for failure to obtain the bond required ti 
by 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, after a trial without a jury, dis· 
missed the claims of all parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and 1 
remand with directions to enter judgment against re· 
spondents for $1,561.68, interest, and costs, including 
an attorney's fee of $750.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents, Frank W. Roberts and W. Cal· 
vin Roberts, co-partners doing business as Roberts 
Investments (hereinafter called "Roberts") owned 
real property at 3838 South Main Street, Salt Lake 
City, upon which they undertook to construct a building 
(R. 16), anticipating construction costs of approxi· 
mately $200,000.00 ( R. 48) . 
2 
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In carrying out the project Roberts employed 
:everal contractors to do different portions of the work 
1.R. 48) . Among the contractors was American Con-
itruction Company, which was to be responsible for 
rrection of the concrete walls for the building. This 
iortion of the contract itself involved more than $500.00 
·Jf construction costs, but Roberts did not require 
.lmerican Construction to furnish any performance 
md payment bond (R. 16). 
Between February 19, 1964, and April 15, 1964, 
.lmerican Construction Company ordered and received 
mncrete from appellant for use in construction of the 
Roberts building, but on about the later date, the con-
iractor ran into construction problems, and dropped 
two walls, causing damage. Roberts stopped American 
Construction from further performance and took over 
that portion of the work itself (R. 52-53). Between 
about May 7, 1964, and August 20, 1964, Roberts 
rurchased concrete from appellant of an agreed and 
reasonable value of $7,505.64. It was used in construc-
tion of the building. 
On August 27, 1964, Frank ,V. Roberts went to 
ippellant' s off ice for the purpose of paying for the 
roncrete it had purchased. Roberts then owed appellant 
·)7,505.64 for concrete purchased by Roberts for con-
1truction of the building. The amount was liquidated 
and undisputed. No portion of it arose out of the sale 
8f concrete to American Construction Company. 
American Construction Company, however, was 
3 
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then indebted to appellant in the amount of $1,561.68 
for concrete furnished on the project before American's 
work was taken over by Roberts. The amount owed by 
American Construction Company was liquidated, was 
maintained a.s a separate account, and was recorded on 
a different ledger card than the Roberts account. 
On the day Frank W. Roberts was in appellant's 
office to pay the Roberts indebtedness both appellant's 
general manager and its office manager inquired about 
the debt of American Construction Company. 
There is not much dispute about Frank W. Roberts' 
reaction to inquiries concerning the American Con· 
struction Company account. L. K. Bradley, appellant's 
general manager, testified that Mr. Roberts said he 
"wasn't obligated" to pay it (R. 36). Jan Zwet.s, appel· 
lant's office manager, testified that Mr. Roberts said 
it"was our problem to straighten out with American 
Construction" { R. 44). Frank Roberts himself testified 
that he told Zwets, "I am not going to pay anything 
that American Construction owes," and that Zwets 1 
could "either sign the lien waiver and I will pay this 
[the Roberts debt], or for get it" ( R. 55). The testi· 
mony of Zwets was that "I told him I would sign a 
lien release for the amount owed Gibbons and Reed 
by Roberts Investment" (R. 42). Zwets then signed 
a recept for $7,505.64 (Exhibit D-1) which contained 
lien release provisions aimed primarily at protection 
of the construction lender, Valley State Bank. 
Frank W. Roberts admitted that he paid appellant 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the exact amount owed for concrete purchased by 
Roberts. Although there had been "a couple of discrep-
ancies" these had been discussed and Robert~ was satis-
fied that the bill rendered was a proper bill. He also 
knew that the claim for $7,505.64 did not include any 
amounts of concrete purchased by American Construc-
tion Company while it was on the job. Nevertheless, 
he told Jan Zwets that unless he signed the receipt he 
would not be paid the amount admittedly owed by 
Roberts (R. 61). 
The document signed by Jan Zwets on Augu~t 27, 
1964 (Exhibit D-1) is in the form of a receipt. Un-
titled, it reads as follows: 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 8/27 1964 
Received of Roberts Investments the sum of 
Seven Thousand & Five Hundred & Five-& 
64/100 DOLLARS ($7,505.64) in (full) pay-
ment for labor and/or material furnished by the 
undersigned for the job at 3838 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
It is understood that this receipt is to be pre-
sented to VALLEY STATE BANK or as-
signs as evidence of payment of the amount 
thereby receipted for to induce said VALLEY 
STATE BANK or assigns to advance to the 
owner of the property above mentioned money 
to be secured by mortgage on said property, 
and, in consideration thereof, it is agreed by the 
undersigned with the VALLEY STATE 
BANK or assigns that any lien .the undersigned 
has or may have against real estate is and shall 
be inferior, subordinate and subsequent to said 
5 
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mortgage; and further, and disputes over 
amounts due and/or material delivered hereto. 
fore between claimant and owner are waived and 
settled and the undersigned releases the owners 
from all and any claims the undersigned may 
have against owner or materials delivered or 
labor performed. For materials delivered to date. 
8/20/64. 
GIBBONS AND REED CONCRETE 
PRODUCTS COMP ANY 
Jan Zwets, Office Manager 
This Payment Covers Concrete Mat." 
A few days thereafter, on September 2, 1964, ap· 
pellant filed a mechanic's lien claim against the property 
(R. 21) for the amount owed by American Construe· 
tion, $1,561.68. The claim was inaccurate in that it 
showed the first material to have been furnished on May 
7, 1964, "to" Roberts Investments. Nothing was said ' 
about material furnished between February 19, 1964, 
and April 15, 1964, at the request of American Con· 
struction Company. On or about February 22, 1965, 
an amendment of claim of mechanic's lien was filed 
with the County Recorder in which the error was cor· 
rected (R. 22-23) 1. 
During the trial it was stipulated that if appellant 
was entitled to an attorney's fee, such fee should be 
fixed in the amount of $750.00 (R. 47). 
1. The amended lien was filed to notify third persons of the 
exact basis for appellant's claim of lien. Appellant does ~ot 
contend that the amendment could validate the original lien 
if it was not valid when filed. 
6 
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On March 13, 1968, the court filed a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 28-29) in which it found, among other 
things, that the release "was a release of all claims and, 
therefore * * * that a judgment of no cause of action 
should be rendered in favor of the [respondent] on 
[appellant's J claim." This appeal involves only Gibbons 
and Reed Concrete Products Company and Roberts 
Investments. By stipulation of the parties the lien was 
released and the sum of $2,400.00 was placed on deposit 
to await further order of the court. Any judgment 
entered, to the extent that the fund is available, will 
be paid out of the fund or a supersedas bond given in 
lieu of it. No appeal has been taken by any party other 
than Gibbons and Reed Concrete Products Company. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE 'VAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR 
A RELEASE BY APPELLANT OF ANY 
CLAIM OTHER THAN THAT ARISING 
FROM THE ROBERTS INVESTMENTS AC-
COUNT. 
The trial court without explanation or apparent 
reason refused to apply contract principles which. have 
been recognized by the Anglo Saxon courts for cen-
turies and by this court since its inception. Courts, text-
writers, legal encyclopedias and college professors agree 
that promises and releases, to be enforceable, must be 
7 
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supported by sufficient consideration2• Restatement of 
Contracts, §19; I Corbin on Contract, §109; 17 C.J.S., 
Contracts, §§71, 402; 17 Am. J ur.2d, Contracts, §86; 
76 C.J.S., Release, §IO; 45 Am. Jur., Release, §11. 
Few material facts are in dispute. It is established 
by the pre-trial order and trial testimony that on August 
27, 1964, Roberts owed appellant $7,505.64 for concrete 
used by Roberts in construction of its building. The 
amount of the debt was liquidated, agreed to, undis· 
puted, and not subject to any reasonable dispute. Yet 
the trial court held that payment of the debt by Roberts 
operated to discharge that company from an entirely 
separate liability arising out of appellant's sales to 
American Construction Company. 
The ruling of necessity rejects the principle that 
performance of a pre-existing legal duty does not con-
stitute consideration for a promise or release. 
In Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961) this court had 
occasion to consider the effectiveness of an instrument 
signed by Ray Tanner which purported to "release 
and discharge" the cooperative "from any and all debts, 
claims, demands and accountings of whatsoever name, 
nature and description," except sums payable under 
2. We recognize that some promise are enforceable without. c.on· 
sideration, i.e., those under seal in some states, and those gi~ng 
rise to a "promissory estoppel." We have limited the discussion 
to consideration because no basis other than "sufficient con· 
sideration" was relied upon by the court in enforcing the release 
(R. 17-19). Although the question of estoppel was raised in t~e 
pre-trial order (R. 18), no evidence was introduced to support it. 
8 
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some certificates of interest. The release was dated 
October 7, 1952, and recited that the payment repre-
sented the "balance owed to me under the marketing 
of my 1951 crop of turkeys." After signing the release 
plaintiff brought an action against the cooperative for 
balances owed for marketing his turkey crop between 
1942 and 1951. The cooperative's defense that the 
claims had been released was upheld in a summary 
judgment but this court reversed on two grounds, one 
of them that there was no consideration for the release. 
The court said: 
"* * * There was no consideration for the 
release of obligations arising out of transactions 
other than the marketing of the 1951 turkeys. 
For defendants did only what they were other-
wise obligated to do. The release expressly re-
cites that the payment was made as the balance 
owing for marketing the 1951 crop of turkeys. 
On the face of the instrument it expressly ap-
pears that the payment was made to liquidate 
that obligation, which defendants agreed was 
the balance owning thereunder. All of the other 
evidence tends to indicate that such was the fact 
and that the parties had agreed to the amount 
owing for the 1951 crop. All of the additional 
evidence * * * definitely tends to indicate that 
the amount paid was the exact amount which 
defendant's books showed that it owed plaintiff 
for the 1951 crop, and that plaintiff agreed to 
this figure after defendants had produced all 
their books and plaintiff's employees had twice 
audited such books. The payment being for the 
exact amount tt'hich the parties had agreed was 
owing to plaintiff from the marketing of his 
9 
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1951 turkeys, there was no consideration given 
for the release of any other liability which de-
fendants owed to plaintiff." lEmphasis added.] 
The present case cannot be distinguished. The 
amount paid by Roberts Investments was the exact 
amount the parties had agreed was owing to appellant 
for concrete sold to Roberts Investments on its own 
account. 
In Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knutken Builders 
Supply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P.2d 982 (1963), a 
liavings and loan company had made a payment and 
obtained a release from a materialman. In an action 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien the claimant contended 
that it was the intention of the parties to release lien 
rights only as to amounts set forth in the authorization, 
and that there was no consideration to support the 
promise to release any other lien rights that might be 
acquired thereafter. This court upheld the contention, 
saymg: 
"* * * It must be noted that the defendant, in 
receiving the payments from Prudential, was 
being paid no more than what it was legally en· 
titled to at the time. Thus, a promise by the de· 
fendant to waive rights to future liens for other 
debts would be without consideration." 
A recent case applying the rule to a claim arising 
under 14-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 (the private 
bonding ~tatute) is Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d 123, 
405 P. 2d 435 ( 1965) . There the plaintiffs, employees 
of a contractor, had been paid with worthless checks. 
10 
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Subsequently they went to the defendant builder who 
paid them for part of their work on condition that they 
sign releases and lien waivers for everything. Respecting 
the transaction this court said: 
"Having violated [the bonding statute], under 
the facts of this case, there was no consideration 
for the waivers, and the failure to require the 
contractor to file a bond to protect these workers 
under the plain wording of the statute, cannot 
ameliorate the obligation of the builder from its 
terms, by any no consideration David Harum 
negotiation with the workers." 
The above cases decided by this court are in accord 
with Restatement of Contracts, §76: 
"Any consideration that is not a promise is 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of § 19 ( c) 3, 
except the following: 
" (a) An act of forbearance required by a legal 
duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject of 
honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is 
owed either to the promissor or the public, or, 
if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed 
to any person; * * *" 
Illustration No. 5 following the quoted rule, could 
have been adopted from the facts in our case: 
"A owes B a liquidated and undisputed debt 
of $100. B has another claim against A, the 
existence or amount of which is honestly and 
reasonably disputed by A. A pays B $100 in 
3. Section 19 ( c) provides that a "sufficient. consider~tion" is 
one of the requirements of law for the formation of an informal 
contract. 
11 
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return for B's agreement to accept the payment 
in full satisfaction of both claims. There is not 
sufficient consideration for B's agreement, since 
A has paid only what he was under a duty to 
pay." 
The rule is similarly stated in 76 C.J.S., Release, 
§14: 
"A release of a legal obligation for which the 
consideration is the performance by the releasee 
of some undisputed legal duty owing by him to 
the releasor or to a third person is invalid for 
want of consideration. * * * So the full payment 
of an admitted debt or the full performance of 
one obligation is not consideration of a release 
of a second debt or obligation." 
Accord: 45 Am. Jur., Release, §13. 
The rules as set out above are supported by an 
annotation, "Payment of undisputed amount or liability 
as consideration for discharge of disputed amount or 
liability," 112 A.L.R. 1219, 1224, wherein it is pointed 
out that there is very little conflict of authority on the 
question of "whether payment of an undisputed claim 
is a consideration for the discharge of another distinct , 
and independent disputed claim."4• The general rule is 
that it is not. 
The facts in the present case are not novel, and 
there is no apparent reason why the rule of law should 
4. The annotator points out that there is a conflict of authority 
on the question of whether payme,nt of the conceded part of a 
single claim is sufficient considerat10n for release of the disputed 
balance. That situation is not involved here. 
12 
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not be applied. The payment made by Roberts was for 
concrete it purchased from appellant after taking over 
the contract work. The payment could not be considera-
tion for release of claims founded upon independent 
transactions between appellant and American Con-
struction Company, which arose by virtue of the lien 
law (Title 38, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953) 
and a statute requiring owners to obtain performance 
and payment bonds when undertaking substantial im-
provements on their property (Title 14, Chapter 2, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
[It should be noted, also, that this was not a case 
in which a debt was paid before it was due, or where 
a debtor agreed to forego bankruptcy in exchange for 
a release. The evidence is that Frank W. Roberts refused 
to pay the amount admittedly due unless appellant's 
office manager signed the release. There was no bar-
gaining about due date or early payments. To consti-
tute consideration, an act or forbearance must be "bar-
gained for and given in exchange for the promise." 
Restatement of Contracts, §75.J 
II 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CON-
STRUED THE RECEIPT AS A RELEASE OF 
ROBERTS INVESTMENTS FROM LIABIL-
ITY. 
The receipt signed by appellant's office manager, 
reprinted herein at pages 5 and 6, should not have been 
13 
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construed as operating in favor of Roberts with respect 
to the American Construction Company debt. It pur-
ports to be an agreement with Valley State Bank, not 
with Roberts; and virtually all of the language is aimed 1 
at protecting Valley State Bank, the construction mort-
gagee. 
If the release is determined to be ambiguous, 
appellant's position is aided by conversations that took 
place when the receipt was given. At no time during 
these conversations was it contended by Frank W. 
Roberts that the receipt was to protect him and his 
partner with respect to the American Construction 
Company debt. His attitude was that the claim was not 
his concern. He said the account was none of his busi· 
ness, he didn't intend to pay it, and appellant would 
have to work it out with American Construction. Not 
once did he say that he intended the receipt to operate 
as a release of the American Construction Company 
debt. He must have believed that the partnership was 
not liable for the American Construction Company debt 
-and that a release of it was not necessary. Otherwise, 
his conduct would amount to intentional deception. 
The receipt having been prepared by Roberts, any 
ambiguity should be resolved against it. The use of the 
exact figure owed by Roberts Investments to appellant, 
$7,505.64, would indicate that it was not intended to 
cover other independent claims. The language in the 
receipt is no broader than that considered by this court 
in Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11 
14 
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l 
Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 ( 1961), discussed, supra.,. in 
connection with consideration. The second ground for 
reversal of the Tanner case was that the trial court had 
misconstrued the release and had applied it too broadly 
in light of the circumstances and recitals, respecting 
which this court said : 
"The release recites that in con~ideration of 
the payment of $9,350.00 from the cooperative 
' (being the balance owed to me under the mar-
keting of my 1951 crop of turkeys) receipt of 
which is acknowledged, I do hereby release and 
discharge the said cooperative from any and all 
debts, * * *' The release clearly states that the 
$9,350.00 from the coopertaive was the balance 
owing Tanner under the marketings of his 1951 
crop of turkeys, payment of which he acknowl-
edged. This would suggest that the release deals 
with obligations of the cooperative arising out 
of its marketing Tanner's 1951 crop of turkeys. 
While the words dealing with the rdease do not 
confine it strictly to obligations arising out of 
the 1951 marketing when read in connection with 
the preceding part of the sentence, it clearly 
suggests that such was the intention of the par-
ties. In view of this fact we conclude that the 
release was ambiguous on this question, and that 
the plaintiff was entitled to introduce evidence, 
which showed that it was the intention of the 
parties that the release was only of liability aris-
ing out of the 1951 marketing of turkeys." 
The evidence introduced in this case indicates that 
there was no bargaining between appellant and re-
spondent respecting the application of the release to 
the indebtedness arising out of the American Construe-
15 
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tion Company purchases. Frank "\V. lloberts simply 
denied that Roberts Investment had anything to do 
with that obligation. There was no suggestion that 
Gibbons and Reed should release the obligation in 
exchange for the payment due, but only that it should 
sign the receipt. In light of the fact that the language 
of the receipt is directly primarily toward protection 
of Valley State Bank, and the promises in it appear 
to run to Valley State Bank, the court erred in con-
struing the instrument as a release of appellant's separate 
claim against Roberts. 
III 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A JUDG-
MENT IN THE AMOUNT OF ITS CLAIM, 
INTEREST, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In this brief, Point III is a consolidation of Points 
IV and V of the statement of points filed with the 
de_signation of record on appeal. It is based upon the 
ground that appellant is entitled to judgment under 
both the lien law and the private bonding statute. 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, a deposit in 
court will be applied to any judgment recovered by 
appellant under either statute. It makes no difference 
therefore, whether appellant's recovery is based upon 
the lien law or the bonding statute, unless it is decided 
that attorney's fees are not allowable in an action based 
upon failure to obtain a bond. 
16 
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Appellant clearly is entitled to judgment under 
14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 19535 unless the receipt 
was effective as a release of that liability. The building 
as contemplated and constructed by Roberts as owner 
exceeded the sum of $500.00; the portion to be con-
structed by American Const ruction Company exceeded 
$500.00; and the contractor was not required to furnish 
any bond at all. No question of timeliness having been 
raised, the pre-trial order (R. 15-17) contains all of 
the facts necessary to support a judgment under the 
bonding statute. 
Prior to 1963 the bonding statute contained only 
two sections, one providing for an action on the .pay-
ment bond, the other permitting an action against the 
owner for failure to require a bond. The section added 
1963 (14-2-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953) provides: 
"In any action brought upon the bond pro-
vided for under this chapter the successful party 
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attor-
ney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action." 
Although there is no express provision for attor-
ney's fees in an action for failure to require a bond, 
the sections should be construed in light of their obvious 
5· "An~ person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who 
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond • • • shall ~e personally liable to all persons who have furnished material 
0~ Performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value h such material furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, 
0~wever, .in any case the prices against upon. Actions to recover lasts~h liability shall be commenced within one year from the forlll.ed~~ the last materials were furnished or the labor per-
17 
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purpose, i.e., to protect laborers and materialmen who 
improve real property, and to encourage owners to 
require bonds. To achieve this purpose and avoid an 
anomolous situation, 14-2-3 should be construed as 
applying not only to actions on bonds, but to actions , 
against owners for failure to require bonds. 
Regardless of the construction placed on 14-2·3, 
appellant is entitled to an attorney's fee under 38-1-8 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, part of the mechanic's lien 
law. Under the admitted and stipulated facts, appellant 
was entitled to judgment foreclosing its lien unless 
two errors in the original lien were ~uch as to invalidate 
it. The errors were ( 1) a statement that the first material 
was furnished on May 7, 1964, rather than on February 
19, 1964; and ( 2) a failure to state that the material 
delivered between February 19, 1964, and May 7, 1964, 
was furnished at the instance and request of American 
Construction Company rather than Roberts Invest-
ments. 
The above errors in appellant's claim of lien fall 
far short-in quantity and magnitude-of those con-
sidered by this court in Chase v. Dawson et ux., 117 
Utah 295, 215 P.2d 390 ( 1950). The contention in that 
case was that the lien was insufficient because it failed 
to state the nature and amount of materials furnished, 
the use to which the materials were applied, to whom 
the same were delivered, the terms and conditions of 
the contract, and whether the one with whom the claim· 
ant made the oral contract was an agent, contractor, 
18 
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or otherwise. Notwithstanding these objections the court 
upheld the lien, saying: 
"The notice of lien is no model. However, 
substantial compliance with the statute is all that 
is required * * * 
"The instrument here in question clearly 
shows that the building materials were furnished 
to the owner, the first named defendant, and 
used 'on and about the house on said land,' which 
is fully and legally described by lot and sub-
division. The notice recites that the materials 
were furnished to the owner Kirby S. Dawson, 
so that it matters not whether the materials were 
ordered by the general contractor, or as to who 
signed for them on the job." 
In Hammond Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 94 Cal. 
App. 119, 270 Pac. 751 (1928), the Supreme Court of 
California upheld a lien although it incorrectly desig-
nated the contractor as an individual rather than a corpo-
ration. The court took the view that the lien law should 
be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, and 
that injury from the misstatement is not to be presumed. 
In Cook, Borden & Co., Inc. v. R. Z. L. Realty 
Corp., 50 R. I. 375, 147 Atl. 891 (1929) the court took 
the position that correction of a delivery date on a 
claim of lien is permissible when the date as corrected 
still leaves the delivery within the required period, there 
being no "substantial alteration of the account." 
In Central Construction Co,,;,,pany v. Hi,ghsmith 
et al., 155 Neb. 113, 50 N.W.2d 817 (1952) the court 
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had occasion to consider a mechanic's lien which had 
been objected to because of errors in the names of the 
persons for whom the work was done, and the dates 
upon which the first and last materials were furnished. 
The court noted that the object of the lien law is to 
secure the claims of those who have contributed to the 
erection of the building and that the legislation should 
receive the most liberal construction giving full effect 
to the provision. If errors are trifling and immaterial, 
or if they are readily explainable as the result of mistake, 
and no element of willfulness appears, the court said, 
regard will be had for the imperfections of human 
machinery, and the recovery of a just debt will not 
be denied where nothing but fair dealing was intended. 
The court then concluded that the three objections to 
the lien were not valid since the errors were triflling 
and immaterial. 
Another case upholding liens against errors found 
not to be substantial and prejudicial, and announcing 
the rule of liberal construction, is Peccole et al v. Luce 
& Goodfellow, Inc., et al., 66 Nev. 360, 212 P.2d 718 
(1949}. See also Ellis-Mylroie Lumber Co. Co. v. St. 
Luke's Hospital et al., 119 Wash. 142, 205 Pac. 398 
(1922}. 
The errors in the mechanic's lien in this case were 
not such as might prejudice the respondents; moreover, 
the errors were understandable since Roberts, after 
taking the job, continued to use. the same personnel, 
including the supervisor, that had been employed by 
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American Construction Company. Under cross exami-
nation Frank W. Roberts admitted that as soon as he 
discovered that the lien had been filed he knew that it 
related to the concrete furnished to American Con-
struction Company, which had been the subject of dis-
cussion on August 27, 1964. 
CONCLUSION 
The present case cannot be distinguished from 
numerous cases, decided by this court and others, hold-
ing that the performance of a pre-existing legal obli-
gation is not good consideration for a promise or a 
release. 
On August 27, 1964, Roberts paid appellant a 
liquidated amount it admittedly owed. There was no 
bargaining between the two companies with respect 
to the release of any other claim, and it is apparent from 
the conversations that there was no intention on the 
part of either the appellant or Roberts to contract with 
respect to either the claim against American Construc-
tion Company, or the liability of Roberts arising out 
of the lien and the private bonding statutes. 
The trial court should not have construed the receipt 
as releasing Roberts Investments from any liability 
other than the $7,505.64 account for which payment 
Was made. If the receipt is so construed, there was not 
suffieient consideration for it, and appellant is not 
bound by it. 
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_ The findings of fact and conclusions of law (R 
17-19) contain no justification for the holding that 
there was "sufficient consideration" for the release, and 
the decision was not based upon evidence adduced at · 
the trial or on the application of ruling case law to 
the facts established. 
The judgment should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County 
with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant 
and against respondents for the amount of the lien 
claim, together with attorney's fees as stipulated, inter· 
est, and costs of the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
ROE, JERMAN & DART 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
510 American Oil Building 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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